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 The ISSEI conference theme focuses on the necessity of drawing from scientific, 
philosophical and aesthetic realms to understand our human condition.  Legal language 
exemplifies this situation because it seeks to achieve certainty, justice and equity.  Such a 
complex undertaking must employ multidisciplinary inquiry.  I find my inspiration for this talk 
in the work of the Italian philosopher and legal theorist, Alessandro Giuliani.  Giuliani 
recognizes that by articulating truth under conditions of uncertainty, legal language cannot be 
approached solely as a scientific or technical endeavor.
Introduction 
1 
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Giuliani insists that the dialectical logic of argumentation has profound implications for 
civic life, particularly as it is revealed in legal language.  To develop this thesis, he recuperates 
Aristotle’s conception of a dialogic community and also draws from the substantial contribution 
to Aristotle’s legacy by the seventeenth-century rhetoric scholar, Giambattista Vico.  I emphasize 
Giuliani’s inventive use of these sources to articulate an argumentatively-based community that 
is capable of bearing the social and civil demands of modernity.  My goal is to make his account 
more robust and broad-based by delineating its understated rhetorical themes. 
 I begin by providing an overview of Giuliani’s participation in a line of thought that 
stretches from Aristotle, through Vico, and to Giuliani’s contemporary, Chaїm Perelman.  
Giuliani regards legal discourse as exemplary for this theory of argumentation, and he grounds 
legal discourse in Aristotelian dialectics.  Then, I seek to clarify the relationship between 
Giuliani’s celebration of dialectics and the rhetorical approach favored by Vico and Perelman.  
The connection, of course, is rooted in Aristotle, who famously concluded that rhetoric and 
dialectic are antistrophos.2
A. 
  I extend Giuliani’s thesis by exploring the connections between 
dialectics and rhetoric in legal language.  My goal is to fully realize Giuliani’s Aristotelian 
theory. 
Formal logic earned its prestige by identifying necessary results, but this prestige was 
premised on an assumption that definitive certitudes regarding “clear” concepts and “certain” 
definitions are preferable to “confused” or multivalent notions.  Unfortunately, in modernity this 
bias has spread to fields of inquiry into human interaction, such as law.  Legal scholars in the 
past did not strive for such precision, recognizing that certainties are unattainable because the 
human life that law regulates is always in flux.  Modernity construed the failure of law and other 
Giuliani’s Recuperation of Dialectical Argumentation 
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social sciences to meet the high standards of formal logic as proof that they are inferior to the 
“exact” sciences.  Rejecting the classical understanding of law, modern theorists have devalued 
the special reasoning skills required in these areas. 
In the Topics, Aristotle describes dialectics as the method of argumentation that brings 
different points of view together and generates knowledge of matters that cannot be 
demonstrated conclusively to be either true or false.  Dialectics is premised on the “logic” of 
persuasion rather than on the compelling force of a deductive demonstration.  Dialectics 
identifies “true” opinions, then, but only in the sense that the “true” opinion is convincing to 
those engaged in a particular discussion.  An opinion that is “true” in this sense must be 
subjected to ongoing review, because it is always possible that a different truth will emerge when 
the opinion is re-examined under a different light, in different circumstances of time and place, 
and using different arguments that are invented and offered by new participants to the dialogue.  
Despite the impermanence of dialectical truth, Giuliani insists that dialectics yields a full-fledged 
form of knowledge, even if it is different from the type of knowledge generated by mathematics 
or empirical science.3
 Critics who believe that all spheres of experience can and should be known through 
formal logic and explained in accordance with the principle of non-contradiction assert that 
dialectics yields only an unstable (and, therefore, untrustworthy) form of argument that is 
wielded by a speaker to secure mere agreement rather than to obtain knowledge.  Along these 
lines, many commentators on Aristotle’s work have long considered dialectics a “lesser logic” in 
comparison to his privileging of hard, inferential logic that approaches problems of knowledge 
analytically, deductively, and systematically.  However, Giuliani remains true to one of 
Aristotle’s most penetrating insights: that it is equally inappropriate to expect a mathematician to 
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be persuasive as it is to expect the rhetorician to offer definitive proofs.4
 Dialectics is a form of knowledge that relies on ordinary language as it is used to express 
opinions about uncertain matters.  Giuliani emphasizes that dialectics and juridical experience 
are closely linked because legal reasoning also involves the proffering and testing of opinions in 
ordinary language.
  Aristotle admonishes 
his students not to abuse reason in the field of opinion by treating that which is by nature 
arguable, uncertain, and unprovable as if it could be established with certainty; to do so is to 
commit an error that obscures the contextual nature of practical reasoning.  Aristotle recognizes 
that arguable issues can and must be resolved through dialectical reasoning -- the form of 
knowledge appropriate to such questions. 
5  Ordinary language is capable of revealing truth because it conveys common 
sense knowledge and understanding, but at the same time it is inevitably imprecise.  Legal 
discourse has a veneer of specialized terms and detailed logic, but it always rests on common 
terms such as “good faith” and “reasonableness” to reach decisions.  The apparent imprecision of 
legal language is not a regrettable failing that we should bemoan and seek to eradicate; rather, it 
is the central, productive feature of legal language.  Legal discourse relies on metaphors to 
temporarily fill some of the gaps caused by the imprecision of ordinary language by making 
analogical connections and illustrating similarities that bring common sense (in the classical 
meaning of sensus communis) to bear on the circumstance of reality or to the case being 
considered, the person using it, the context in which it is used, and the moment when it is used.  
Giuliani insists that it is especially important for the jurist never to lose sight of being immersed 
in ordinary language, arguing that “when there is no awareness of the metaphorical nature [of 
language], the road to the most dangerous abuses of language is opened.”6  We lose this 
awareness when we attempt to force the ordinary language of law to embody formal precision 
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and objectivity.  This error sacrifices the depth and multi-valence conveyed by the metaphoric 
structure of ordinary language, which connects with the concrete experience of both individuals 
and society as a whole. 
Given how dialectics works to generate knowledge, Giuliani insists that cooperation 
between the dialogue partners is necessary to some degree.  In other words, the parties join in 
dialectical dialogue to seek the truth.7
First, dialogue participants should concentrate on eliminating some opinions from 
consideration by progressively casting light upon the reasons why certain arguments are 
immaterial to the specific dispute in question, based on the circumstances under discussion.  This 
posture requires one to grapple with the proffered opinion in its own right, rather than reflexively 
attacking it from the perspective of one’s own opinion purely for strategic reasons.  The guiding 
norm of dialogue is “identifying contradictions between conflicting opinions” rather than 
selecting one’s preferred opinion and defending it at all costs by characterizing the contest as 
placing the decisionmaker on the “horns of a dilemma.” 
  Unlike the monologue of logical demonstration, dialectic 
is always a dialogue that seeks to choose between multiple potential resolutions of the question.  
The parties to a juridical dispute are engaged -- perhaps unwittingly in adversarial systems -- in 
just such a cooperative dialogue.  This is not to say that legal argumentation always proceeds in a 
wholly cooperative manner.  Indeed, it is by recognizing the requirement of cooperation that 
illuminates how dialectical argumentation might fail and degenerate into sophism.  Dialogue, no 
less than language generally, is subject to abuses.  Giuliani outlines the prerequisites of dialectic 
to prevent such abuses. 
Additionally, dialectical argumentation should take inspiration from the logic of 
relevance and pertinence: the arguments that are introduced must be connected with the issue 
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being investigated.  To make this possible, the participants must reach some topical agreements 
connected with the content and the characteristics of the dispute, so as to permit development of 
a common basis from which the participants may reason.  This brings to the fore the need to limit 
the field of investigation, so as to protect against the possibility of error and abuse by focusing on 
the concrete nature of the case being considered rather than on the superficial eristic battle. 
The truth that can be reached in dialectical exchange is a partial and relative one, subject to 
future revisions precisely because of the cooperative procedure of the dialogue.  The goal is a 
“probable” truth, but this does not mean “probable” in the modern sense of an objective or 
statistical regularity of occurrences confirming or disproving a certain point of view.  Instead, 
probability must be appreciated qualitatively: the discussion always takes place with reference to 
a single event and must be sensitive to the surrounding elements that influence the configuration 
of that event, but also must be anchored topically to broader issues and historical developments.  
Truth is inevitably kairotic – which is to say, sensitive to the time in which the event is produced, 
because as times change, so do such qualitative elements as the provisional judgments, common 
sense, and ways of thinking that configure it. 
Probable truth requires the participants to comply with rules of fair debate and to eschew 
sophistic manipulations.  This means that dialectical truth can be achieved only if the participants 
display an ethical commitment to each other.  The ethical commitment is not to collaborate with 
the aim of establishing a single definitive truth, but rather to remain open to everyone expressing 
their opinions in an honest and forthright manner with the expectation that they will be taken 
seriously by the others in the dialogue.  The truth that is attained in the dialectical exchange, 
Giuliani stresses, has a procedural character but it also has an ethical dimension.  This is the 
fundamental distinction between dialectical dialogue and sophistic: dialectics is ethically 
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oriented by the mutual recognition of each participant for the other, acknowledging their ability 
to contribute to seeking the truth, and thus their equality as dialogue partners. 
B. 
 Giuliani’s impressive recuperation of the dialectical tradition is powerful, and it provides 
substantial guidance to contemporary legal theorists.  He repeatedly emphasizes that he is not 
reading the dialectical tradition in a narrow, scientistic manner, but I believe that this aspect of 
his theory must be clarified and strengthened, especially for the sake of American readers.  In 
common academic usage in the United States, “dialectics” is regarded as a more rule-bound and 
definitive practice of reasoning together with someone toward a conclusion, whereas “rhetoric” 
has a more open-ended connotation of persuading an audience through artful presentations.  This 
division is reflected today in the contrast between the Dutch pragma-dialectical school on one 
hand, and American rhetorical theory on the other.  These schools define the outer boundaries of 
the inquiry into reasonable dialogue that exists between the poles of rationalism and logical 
deduction on one hand, and skepticism and sophistic on the other. 
Dialectical Knowledge and Rhetoric 
 I do not mean to suggest that Giuliani ignores rhetoric.  He refers to the rhetorical 
tradition and particularly to the effort of modern theorists to revive Vico’s wisdom.8  He 
recognizes that law, politics and ethics are enmeshed in both dialectic and rhetoric,9 given that 
both arts reason toward solutions that are indeterminate because they rest on opinion and 
probabilities.  Giuliani laments that dialectics was hijacked in the Middle Ages and made to 
appear more logical as part of the effort to discredit the rhetorical tradition,10 and so to some 
degree he is combating the historical attack on rhetoric.  His goal is to reclaim dialectic as a 
counterpart to rhetoric, with neither collapsible to the other but with both occupying the realm 
between science and sophistry.11 
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Giuliani also relates the rhetorical tradition to legal argumentation, as exhibited by his 
praise of the rhetorical dialectics of the common law method that persisted in parts of the world, 
unlike the European context in which the logical pretense of civil lawyers appeared to sever the 
connection.12  He advocates an approach to legal education that imbues students with the 
classical lessons of both rhetoric and dialectics.13
 My argument is that Giuliani’s theory will be greatly enhanced by an even more 
purposeful and detailed incorporation of rhetoric.  Unfortunately, Giuliani generally refers to his 
method as “dialectical,” and so it is necessary to elaborate the uniquely rhetorical features of his 
approach.  Scholars recently have made headway in this regard, returning to the original 
Aristotelian conception of dialectics and rhetoric as antistrophos.  Noting that “it must be 
acknowledged that neither the dialectical perspective nor the rhetorical perspective is so clearly 
and univocally defined that we know exactly what we are talking about,” two editors of a recent 
volume of important essays conclude that there are distinctions between dialectic and rhetoric, 
even these differences vary over time.
  In conclusion, it is clear that Giuliani accepts 
the rhetorical dimensions of his theory of argumentation. 
 14  Francesco Cerrone makes the distinction succinctly and 
skillfully: “Dialectic thus corresponds to the moment of judgment as rhetoric does to that of 
invention, understood as a part of discourse dedicated to choosing and selecting arguments.”15  
The important point is that these distinctions are illuminating, but not fundamental.  We can say 
that dialectic is a means of testing a hypothesis through reasonable discourse, whereas rhetoric is 
a means of securing the agreement of an audience, but it should be apparent that these activities 
are closely entwined in most sophisticated dialogues.16
It is surely no accident that the faith in the critical workings of this argumentative 
interplay [of dialectic and rhetoric] also lies at the root of our confidence, 
  This is especially true of legal reasoning 
and argumentation.   
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however circumscribed, in the proper working of the legal adversarial system, and 
that legal argumentation perhaps more clearly than other forms of reasoning 
highlights the need to link dialectical soundness and rhetorical acceptability in the 
analysis and design of good arguments.17
 
 
By exploring this rich notion of argumentation we may flesh out Giuliani’s dialectical theory of 
argumentation. 
 An important reference for conjoining dialectic and rhetoric is Vico’s famous oration at 
the dawn of the eighteenth century, On the Methods of Study in Our Time.  Vico stood as the last 
great defender of the ancient reverence of rhetoric and dialectics at the time that the modern era 
of rationalism was gaining ascendance over the classical worldview.  Giuliani drew extensively 
from Vico’s bold stand against the bias of modernity, and also from Perelman’s effort in the last 
century to revive rhetoric and dialectics as forms of knowledge.  It does no violence to Giuliani’s 
theory to incorporate their detailed rhetorical insights to his work, although it may necessitate 
altering Giuliani’s assumption that dialectic is superior to rhetoric.18
 I conclude by offering suggestions for how we can expand the scope of Giuliani’s theory 
of legal argumentation by incorporating rhetoric.  Giuliani’s focus on the cooperative nature of 
dialectical argumentation rings somewhat hollow in the ears of those whose legal system is 
adversarial because the practice of law seems inevitably to be at odds with this cooperation.  We 
might agree that certain aspects of legal argumentation follow the dialectical model when the 
parties reason from shared assumptions, but many legal arguments are a contest to define the 
primary assumptions that should ground the effort of dialectical reasoning to reach a conclusion.  
Giuliani is correct that there is a cooperative dialectic in legal argumentation, but it is made 
possible only through the rhetorical establishment of shared opinions from which the cooperative 
argumentation may begin.  Aristotle distinguishes “demonstration” from “dialectic” by linking 
 By joining rhetoric and 
dialectic as antistrophos, we can best capture the full dimensions of legal argumentation. 
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the former to premises which are necessarily true (“primary”) and the latter to “premises that are 
generally accepted.”19
Aristotle recognizes that the framing of the question by the dialectician is not the same as 
the framing of a philosophical question, because “how to go on to arrange his points and frame 
the question” necessarily involves “a reference to another party.”
  Rhetoric is necessary because we don’t always begin our reasoning with 
clearly delineated opinions that are accepted by both sides.  Aristotle defines rhetoric as the art of 
seeing, in a given case, the available means of persuasion.  There are multiple opinions that 
might be accepted by those in the dialogue, and identifying the shared opinions that probably 
will lead, through dialectical reasoning, to the desired result is part of the rhetorical art that 
subtends legal argumentation. 
20  Aristotle acknowledges the 
significance of the audience in dialogue, but then he proceeds to describe how one may 
strategically present the premises from which the argument will proceed.  At this point, one 
might criticize Aristotle for making a sham of dialectical reasoning by reducing it to sophistic, 
but by construing this initial stage in the argumentation as a rhetorical engagement we can 
appreciate the ethical integrity that should guide the persuader.  Rhetorical theory differentiates 
one who gains agreement through sophistry, and one who persuades through logos, ethos and 
pathos.  Indeed, the motivating purpose of The Rhetoric is to demonstrate that rhetoric has 
integrity as a form of reasoning that generates knowledge between the speaker and audience 
about desirable and acceptable courses of action, even if rhetoric does not generate logical truths 
or even dialectical truths.  In dialectic, the ethic is a cooperative effort to follow from accepted 
premises to uncertain conclusion.  In rhetoric, the ethic is a persuasive encounter in which one 
seeks the other’s agreement with integrity.  As Gene Garver summarized with the title of one of 
his books, rhetoric is “an art of character.”21 
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There are many ways in which the rhetorical tradition will add concrete and practical 
dimensions to the study of legal language.  For example, Vico’s famous description of the 
“ingenious method” of rhetorical education -- teaching students to argue both sides of a matter so 
as to learn the art of inventing arguments -- points to the development of a key capacity that is 
not captured solely by the logic of dialectical argument.  This “ingenious method” is supposed to 
form the core of modern legal education, but students easily are bewitched by the “dialectical 
moves” in the cases they read.  As a result, they misunderstand the critical role of rhetorical 
framing for the argument that follows.22
The relevance of rhetorical theory extends beyond insights into how we might reform 
legal pedagogy.  Chaïm Perelman famously argued that some rhetorical appeals are made to a 
“universal audience,” as is the case in philosophical argumentation.  The “universal audience” is 
not an empirical reality, but rather is a construction that the speaker uses to frame the 
argument.
 
23  Although his concept is heavily debated and rejected by many of his adherents, I 
believe that the idea of making an appeal to the “universal audience” is critical to understanding 
how lawyers frame their arguments about the accepted opinions from which they will argue.  In 
legal argumentation these appeals take the form of a natural law argument, although the speaker 
often disguises the basis of the argument.24 
 As a lawyer and law professor, I have no doubt that natural law arguments (even if not 
expressly characterized as such) are ubiquitous and perhaps unavoidable in legal practice.  If we 
agree with Perelman that there is no abiding structure of reality that grounds these arguments 
ontologically, we must seek to understand these arguments by exploring the character of the 
audience that the legal orator seeks to construct, and the manner by which the orator seeks to 
motivate an actual audience to act in response to these arguments.  This task is possible only by 
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employing a conception of the universal audience, and therefore Perelman’s philosophical 
clarification of legal argumentation is a substantial addition to Giuliani’s analysis of legal 
dialectics.  I have argued that regarding natural law claims as rhetorical commonplaces that 
resonate with an audience inspired to reconstitute itself as the universal audience resides at the 
center of Perelman’s theory of argumentation and should be accepted as a major contribution 
rather than an obscure detail in Perelman scholarship.25 
 A natural law argument is directed to a universal audience for whom the actual audience 
– whether a jury, judge or appellate panel – serves as a stand-in.  But this is not to say that the 
audience is hypothesized to be generically “rational” or “philosophical.”  Claims in this setting 
are peculiarly legal in nature, and are best paraphrased in the manner of the Sophists in ancient 
Greece: “no reasonable person seeking to implement the values of our legal system could 
conclude that slavery is legitimate, notwithstanding our custom and written laws to the 
contrary.”26  Arguments traditionally couched in natural law terms are not arguments to a 
timeless and decontextualized rational being; instead they are arguments designed to provoke the 
actual audience to rise above their parochial interests and to conceive of themselves as 
empowered to articulate truth, justice and other confused notions in a manner that all persons 
should find persuasive.27 
 
Conclusion 
 Giuliani’s dialectical theory of argumentation represents an important fulfillment of 
Aristotle’s work.  In this talk I have argued that supplementing his work with a more detailed 
consideration of rhetorical theory, also rooted in Aristotle, would enhance the effort to overcome 
the stifling positivism and anti-intellectualism that too often define our approach to law. 
Francis J. Mootz III 
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